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August 1, 2017
Breakout Sessions
focused in the area of farm
management. She attended Montana State … majoring in Agribusiness Management.
Her PhD in Economics is …
August 1, 2017
Breakout Sessions
perceptions and preferences, risk management, and technology
acceptance … production economics, and farm management.
Abstract/Summary
Over …
October 2, 2017
2017 Crop Insurance Workshop Presentations
tion Pilot Insurance Program
Risk Management Agency
1
Casey Collins
Se … 1
Casey Collins
Senior Risk Management Specialist
Topeka Regional Office
2641 SW Wanamaker Rd., Suite 201
Topeka, KS 66614
Phone‐ …
March 23, 2016
Land Buying and Valuing
Kansas real estate taxes on pasture land are likely to increase less than
irrigated or non‐irrigated land although they will likely increase the next
few years
Farm Management Association Property
Tax Payments
Methods
• … Methods
• Use Kansas Farm Management Data to examine the taxes paid from
2010 through 2014
• …
2018 Extension Outlook Conference
1986 to 2003
Kansas Farm Management Association Debt Levels
$0
$100,000
$200,000
$300,000
$400,000
$500,000
$600,000
$700,000
2005 … asset ratio for Kansas Farm
Management Farms
1979 – 24.6% 2016 …
June 27, 2016
Precision Ag and Technology Articles
3
quantifiable. These losses are the ‘actual damages’ that the expert witness would estimate using net present
value of subsequent changes in farm revenue.
Reasonable royalty
Reasonable royalty will not likely be the damages sought by individual farms because the hypothetical
negotiation is expected to arrive at an impasse. In this scenario, the farmer and aggregator enter into a
hypothetical negotiation where the farmers’ bargained‐for price of data were determined. Again, we look to the
economic theory of networks to examine how this hypothetical negotiation turned out. Economic theory
suggests that, in the long run, the aggregator places very little value on data from any individual farm and
therefore would not negotiate beyond $0. The farmer who values farm data as a good, i.e. positive value, would
not accept the $0 offered by the aggregator. Farmers’ reservation prices, or willingness‐to‐accept for their farm
data, starkly differ from the price that aggregators are willing to pay. From the perspective of the aggregator, it
makes very little difference whether any given farmer participates in the network. This is where the estimation
becomes tricky. We know that the value to the aggregator is greater than the summation of all the individual
benefits; however we also know that any given farmer can withdraw from the network without causing the
aggregator to lose value with respect to the network once a critical number of farms are in the system. Therein
lies the problem of determining the bargained‐for price; the aggregator can argue that the value of any given
farm is $0 to the aggregator. Since the parties are not likely to converge on an agreed upon price, the
‘reasonable royalty’ would be the most difficult of the three damages to defend. As the expert witness for the
farmer, I would avoid attempting to prove a ‘reasonable royalty’ since the testimony would be based on an
individual farm’s losses.
Unjust enrichment
As the expert witness, ‘unjust enrichment’ is the damage that my testimony would be easiest to prove and
therefore the most likely candidate for farmers to claim damages. Given that the marginal value to an individual
farm is relatively small, the misappropriator has the opportunity to disproportionately benefit or enjoy some
sort of “unjust enrichment.” Even for well‐meaning aggregators who initially would not disclose data to others
for a profit, the temptation may become too large to ignore. For these reasons, ‘unjust enrichment’ is a logical
damage to seek. At the community level, farm data has value to the aggregator and other third parties for
commodity marketing manipulation, supply chain management, improvement of products, and so on. Although
the preceding examples are not malicious on their own, we’ll proceed assuming that the agreement between
the farm and aggregator precluded these examples. In this case, the misappropriator has opportunity to
disproportionately gain from the unauthorized use or sale of community farm data. However, a value to the
misappropriator may be in the millions of dollars but would equate to only pennies on the acre to the farmer.
…
August 1, 2019
Breakout Sessions
A relatively new risk management tool• Created under the Agricultural Act of 2014• … Backed by USDA’s Risk Management Agency• Must sign up prior to planting
What is SCO’s purpose?
• …
August 21, 2019
2018 Farm Bill
yields reported by the Risk Management Agency (crop insurance) instead … this their
number one risk management tool. Subtle changes include …
October 1, 2019
2019 Ag Lenders Conference Presentations
A relatively new risk management tool• Created under the Agricultural Act of 2014• … Backed by USDA’s Risk Management Agency• Must sign up prior to planting
What is SCO’s purpose?
• …
September 16, 2020
Limit-Feeding Stockers
repairs are all Kansas Farm Management
Association (KFMA) values … loss is the same under both management methods. Therefore, the total …